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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
 
LORI A. FLEMING 
Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
RAUL EDGAR HERRERA, aka EDGAR 
CANTU, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
 
        NO. 45547 
 
        Canyon County Case No.  
        CR-2014-26736 
 
           
        RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Must Herrera’s appeal be dismissed as untimely? 
 
 
Herrera’s Appeal Should Be Dismissed Because It Is Untimely 
 
 A jury found Herrera guilty of first degree murder, robbery, burglary, second degree 
kidnapping, and aggravated battery, and the district court imposed concurrent sentences of life, 
with 35 years fixed, for first degree murder; life, with 30 years fixed, for robbery; 10 years fixed 
for burglary; life, with 20 years fixed, for second degree kidnapping; and 15 years fixed for 
aggravated battery.  (R., pp.58-59.)  Herrera filed a Rule 35 motion for correction of an illegal 
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sentence, claiming that his sentence for second degree kidnapping was illegal because it 
exceeded the statutory maximum, and that his sentence for first degree murder was illegal 
because he believed that the “maximum penalty” the district court was authorized to impose for 
first degree murder was life, with 10 years fixed.  (R., pp.68-70.)  At the hearing on Herrera’s 
Rule 35 motion, the state acknowledged that Herrera’s sentence for second degree kidnapping 
exceeded the maximum sentence of 25 years permitted by I.C. § 18-4504(2), and the parties 
stipulated to “adjusting the kidnapping sentence to become a 20-year fixed sentence with no 
indeterminate time” if the district court determined that the first degree murder sentence was 
legal.  (8/8/17 Tr., p.34, Ls.4-5; p.40, Ls.10-18.)  On August 16, 2017, the district court entered 
an Order Re: Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration Pursuant to ICR 35, granting Herrera’s 
motion to correct an illegal sentence as to the sentence for second degree kidnapping, and 
denying the motion as to the sentence for first degree murder (finding that Herrera’s sentence for 
first degree murder was legal because the “mandatory ten year fixed sentence required by [I.C.] § 
18-4004 is the minimum possible sentence,” not the maximum, and the court was “therefore 
entitled, in its discretion, to impose any sentence between ten years and life”).  (R., pp.150-55.)   
At the subsequent hearing for re-sentencing on the second degree kidnapping charge, the 
parties again stipulated to the imposition of a fixed 20-year sentence.  (9/18/17 Tr., p.43, Ls.11-
16.)  The district court granted the parties’ request and, on October 5, 2017, entered an amended 
judgment of conviction, amending Herrera’s sentence for second degree kidnapping to 20 years 
fixed.  (R., pp.161-63.)  On October 25, 2017, Herrera filed a notice of appeal timely only from 
the amended judgment of conviction.  (R., pp.164-67.)   
Mindful of legal authority to the contrary, Herrera nevertheless asserts that the district 
court erred by denying his Rule 35 motion for correction of an illegal sentence “in regard to his 
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allegation that the sentence for his murder conviction was unlawful.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.3-4.)  
This Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Herrera’s appellate challenge to the denial of his Rule 
35 motion to correct his sentence for first degree murder because Herrera did not timely appeal 
from the district court’s order denying that motion.   
Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a) requires an appellant to file a notice of appeal within 42 days 
from the entry of “any judgment or order of the district court appealable as a matter of right in 
any civil or criminal action.”  The requirement of filing a notice of appeal with 42 days of the 
entry of an order appealable as a matter of right is jurisdictional, and any appeal taken after 
expiration of the filing period must be dismissed.  I.A.R. 21 (failure to file a notice of appeal 
within time limits prescribed by appellate rules is jurisdictional and requires automatic dismissal 
of the appeal). 
The district court entered its Order Re: Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration Pursuant 
to ICR 35, denying Herrera’s Rule 35 motion for correction of his sentence for first degree 
murder, on August 16, 2017.  (R., pp.150-55.)  That order was one “made after judgment 
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant or the state” and was, therefore, an order 
appealable as a matter of right.  I.A.R. 11(c)(9); see also State v. Fuller, 104 Idaho 891, 891-92, 
665 P.2d 190, 190-91 (Ct. App. 1983) (order denying Rule 35 motion appealable as matter of 
right under then existing I.A.R. 11(c)(6), which has since been re-designated I.A.R. 11(c)(9)).  
Accordingly, if Herrera wished to challenge the court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion for 
correction of the sentence imposed upon his conviction for first degree murder, it was incumbent 
upon Herrera to file a notice of appeal within 42 days of the entry of that order.  I.A.R. 14(a).  
Herrera did not do so and, instead, filed his notice of appeal on October 25, 2017 – 70 days after 
the district court entered the Order Re: Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration Pursuant to ICR 
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35.  (R., pp.164-67.)  Because Herrera failed to file his notice of appeal within 42 days of the 
order denying his Rule 35 motion, this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction to consider Herrera’s 
challenge to that order.  I.A.R. 21.   
Herrera did timely file his notice of appeal from the district court’s amended judgment of 
conviction, entered on October 5, 2017.  (R., pp.161-67.)  For the reasons that follow, however, 
the timeliness of Herrera’s appeal from the amended judgment does not confer jurisdiction on 
this Court to entertain the issue Herrera raises on appeal – “[w]hether the district court erred by 
denying [his] Rule 35 motion,” “in regard to his allegation that the sentence for his murder 
conviction was unlawful.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.3.)   
Idaho Appellate Rule 17(e)(1)(B) states that a notice of appeal from a judgment or order 
“shall be deemed to include, and present on appeal … [a]ll final judgments and orders entered 
prior to the judgment or order appealed from for which the time for appeal has not expired.”  
(Emphasis added).  As explained by the Idaho Supreme Court, as used in I.A.R. 17(e)(1)(B), 
“[t]he phrase ‘for which the time for appeal has not expired’ refers to the ‘orders … entered prior 
to the judgment.’”  Harrison v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 149 Idaho 201, 204, 
233 P.3d 132, 135 (2010) (ellipses in original).  Thus, “[t]he time for appeal from those orders 
must not have expired in order for them to be included in an appeal from the ‘judgment … 
appealed from.’”  Id. (ellipses in original).  As explained above, by the time Herrera filed his 
notice of appeal from the amended judgment of conviction, the 42-day time limit for filing an 
appeal from the court’s order denying Herrera’s rule 35 motion had already expired.  
Consequently, Herrera’s appeal from the amended judgment cannot be deemed to have included 
the order denying his Rule 35 motion.  See Harrison, 149 Idaho at 204, 233 P.3d at 135 (appeal 
from judgment did not confer jurisdiction on appellate court to consider challenge to pre-
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judgment order confirming arbitration award because arbitration award was itself an appealable 
order and the time for appeal of that order had already expired). 
The state anticipates Herrera may attempt to argue that his challenge to the legality of the 
sentence imposed upon his first degree murder conviction is a direct challenge to the amended 
judgment of conviction and, therefore, his appeal is timely.  Any such argument would be 
without merit.  It is well settled that the entry of an amended judgment that is substantively 
identical to the original judgment does not enlarge the period for filing an appeal, and the 
appellate court does not have jurisdiction to address matters unaffected by the subsequent 
judgment.  State v. Ciccone, 150 Idaho 305, 308, 246 P.3d 958, 961 (2010); State v. Payan, 128 
Idaho 866, 867, 920 P.2d 82, 83 (Ct. App. 1996).  The district court’s amended judgment of 
conviction, entered on October 5, 2017, did not deny Herrera’s motion for correction of his 
sentence for first degree murder; rather, it “reflects a change only to count IV,” correcting only 
Herrera’s sentence for second degree kidnapping, and “[a]ll other terms and conditions remain 
the same and effective as of the original judgment.”  (R., pp.161-63 (underlining omitted).)  
Because the amended judgment did not deny Herrera’s motion to correct his sentence for first 
degree murder or affect his sentence for first degree murder in any way, the entry of the amended 
judgment did not enlarge the time in which Herrera was required to file an appeal from the order 
denying his Rule 35 motion for correction of his sentence for first degree murder in order to 
challenge the denial of that motion.   
Because Herrera’s appeal of the district court’s Order Re: Defendant’s Motion for 
Reconsideration Pursuant to ICR 35 is not timely, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider it and 
Herrera’s appeal must be dismissed.    
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Conclusion 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to dismiss Herrera’s appeal as untimely. 
       
 DATED this 6th day of April, 2018. 
 
 
 
      __/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________ 
      LORI A. FLEMING 
      Deputy Attorney General 
 
 
      VICTORIA RUTLEDGE 
      Paralegal 
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